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Abstract
This is a response to Sensoy and DiAngelo’s critique of common guidelines used in social justice education and their justification for the use of silencing the voice of systemically privileged students.
I expand their argument by posing some questions about the risks of silencing and also suggesting an
alternative strategy to the one Sensoy and DiAngelo recommend.
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S

ensoy and DiAngelo (2014) provide a compelling
critique of the contents of guidelines that are commonly
used in social justice pedagogy. They point to the limits
(and dangers) of using such guidelines by exposing the disjuncture
between the common guidelines’ underlying assumption of
equality regarding student voice and safety and the goals of social
justice education, which take power and social location seriously.
Guidelines that express a concern for the voice and safety of all
students regardless of social location and that grant equal time for
all perspectives risk sacrificing the educational interests and needs
of those who are systemically marginalized. Such guidelines not
only ignore power relations in the classroom but may also reify
rather than challenge those hierarchies.
I concur with Sensoy and DiAngelo’s (2014) critique of these
common guidelines. In particular, their argument about how
common guidelines stifle the ability of marginalized instructors to
contest the extra resistance they experience as they attempt to
“push students past their comfort zones” (p. 5) is extremely
insightful. My aim in this response is to offer some clarifying
comments and questions and to suggest some further thoughts
about the strategies for responding to power in the social justice
classroom that the authors recommend.
A first clarifying point: While Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) are
focused on common guidelines, it is not guidelines themselves that
they reject. In fact, they offer an alternative form of guidelines in
their conclusion. They don’t critique guidelines because, as some
have argued, guidelines, in general, don’t work. For example, in a
discussion of Weber’s guidelines—which require students to
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“acknowledge that racism, classism, sexism, heterosexism, and
other institutionalized forms of oppression exist” and to “agree to
combat actively the myths and stereotypes about our own groups
and other groups so that we can break down the walls that prohibit
group cooperation and group gain”—Gordon (2007, p. 347) claims
that guidelines point to a fundamental misunderstanding about
imposing conditions on dialogue that lead to pretense rather than
to genuine learning. He insists that guidelines be learning goals
rather than expectations or prerequisites for discussion. Sensoy and
DiAngelo (2014), in contrast, clearly believe that guidelines can be
effective in encouraging dialogue across difference and can
facilitate authentic learning.
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) are more troubled by the assumptions that ground a particular type of guidelines. Specifically, they
expose the pedagogical consequences of assumptions such as the
ideology of individualism, which posits persons as unique and
detached from any social context and that assume all voices are to
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be respected equally without regard to social location. Not only do
such assumptions conceal systemic relations of dominance in the
classroom but they reproduce them as well. Most significantly,
Sensoy and DiAngelo support the need for silencing dominant
voices in the classroom when those voices harm marginalized
students by constraining the ability of the marginalized to express
their experiences with oppression. As they explain, they have come
to deny equal time in the classroom in order to “correct the existing
power imbalances by turning down the volume on dominant
narratives” (p. 3). Silencing what dominant students can say in the
class, the authors recognize, challenges the values and practices
that go to the heart of democratic education, but nevertheless they
contend that silencing can be justified.
As an illustration of justified silencing, Sensoy and DiAngelo
(2014) describe a situation in which a queer-identified speaker is
invited to a class to share experiences with oppression. After the
presentation a straight student dismisses what the speaker said by
pronouncing that she disagrees with the queer lifestyle and that she
deems homosexuality immoral. The instructor of the course not
only allows the student to speak and does not intervene but also
“thanks her for sharing her perspective” (p. 3). Sensoy and
DiAngelo argue that “this is exactly the type of context in which
dominant knowledge claims must be silenced” (p. 3).
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) acknowledge that dominant
views must be made visible before they can be challenged, but they
only permit dominant perspectives to be expressed “in controlled
and structured ways” (p. 3). By “controlled and structured,” they
mean to include the possibility of silencing a student when
necessary, as in the case they describe. The justifications they offer
for silencing the dominant student are as follows. First, dominant
ideologies are difficult to dislodge and are characteristically
arrogantly certain. Second, such narratives tend to hijack the
discussion and recenter dominant interests. Finally, to give
dominant voices equal time intimates that their perspective is
equally valid, and this not only supports systemic ignorance but
also ignores how the expression of dominant discourse is a form of
microaggression.
Although I agree that the expression of dominant voices
has these effects, a second clarifying point or question arises:
Is silencing the only or the most appropriate response that the
instructor could have made? Boler (2004) similarly justifies the
option of silencing dominant voices in the social justice classroom. She proposes what she refers to as “affirmative action pedagogy” that “seeks to ensure that we bear witness to marginalized
voices in our classroom, even at the minor cost of limiting dominant voices [emphasis added]” (p. 4). Like Sensoy and DiAngelo
(2014), Boler (2004) rejects the notion that that democratic
dialogue entails treating all voices as equal because not all voices
carry the same weight and “some voices are foreclosed before
even speaking” (p. 11). Yet the emphasis that Boler puts on
“challenging oneself and one’s student to analyze critically any
statement made in a classroom, especially those which are rooted
in dominant views that subordinate on the basis of race, gender,
and class” (p. 4) allows her to also find a place in social justice
education for a “let all speech fly” approach. In this latter approach,
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all students are made accountable for their speech in the sense that
any ignorant expression that is rooted in privilege will be challenged. Perhaps it is not that the instructor in Sensoy and
DiAngelo’s example failed to silence the dominant student’s voice.
Rather, what might have been problematic was that the instructor
seemed reluctant to challenge the dominant perspective.
No doubt there are some situations in which silencing a
student is appropriate. Yet there are also some consequences of
silencing dominant voices that require consideration. Mayo (2004),
for instance, contends that regulating words (and silencing) instead
of addressing underlying attitudes and practices may harm
marginalized groups in the long run. On the one hand, silencing
certain words may have the effect of bolstering the attitudes behind
those discursive practices and remove them from critical discussion. Silencing may similarly protect privilege rather than challenge
it. Case and Hemmings (2005) describe how White students often
use silence as a distancing strategy to avoid having to consider their
complicity in racism. Such students often explain that they are silent
because “they don’t want to offend” but, according to Case and
Hemmings, this discursive strategy functions to protect White
innocence and contributes to students’ disengagement with the
reading material and classroom discussions. Silencing systemically
privileged students in the classroom may risk reinforcing the
privilege they have to remain silent and encourage their ability to
avoid the discomfort that is necessary to learn about their complicity in social injustice.
On the other hand, silencing can lead students to use certain
words out of political correctness and in other ways that protect
their innocence. As Mayo (2004) suggests, silencing certain words
can encourage practices of civility that “enable dominant people to
protect their own property interest in the source of their dominance” (p. 35). In other words, silencing may indeed result in
dominant-group members ceasing to use offensive words but allow
them to appear to be sensitive (and thus not culpable for inequalities) without a fuller understanding of why these words are
problematic in the first place.
Mayo (2004) further interrogates the exclusive focus on the
individual perpetrator at the possible cost of ignoring and keeping
intact the institutional and systemic injustice that subjects repeat.
For a variety of reasons including their understanding of responsibility (Applebaum, 2012), it is important to help dominant students
understand that while they do not inaugurate injustice, they are
complicit in perpetuating it. While dominant-group members
should be held accountable for their words, targeting the utterance
and the person may leave the power of regulatory norms unaffected. Silencing may also usurp the agency of the marginalized by
depriving them of an opportunity to talk back and speak for
themselves.
De Castell (2004) critically examines the value of dialogue
across difference, more broadly, by drawing attention to the focus
on voice and silence. Such a focus treats the symptom rather than
the cause of injustice. De Castell interrogates the confidence educators put in the “talking cure” and suggests that we “unwittingly
suspend critical insight” (p. 54) into structures of power and
normative violence when we center attention on the individual
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who is not the source of ignorance and hostility. Rather than
focusing on voice and silence, de Castell advocates that social
justice educators should be first and foremost concerned with
countering ignorance.
Educators, however, are not always equipped with the
necessary skills to facilitate the difficult dialogues that challenge
ignorance and therefore may be hesitant and unclear about
challenging their dominant students. And if they are systemically
privileged, they may either be ignorant themselves or fear the
conflict that challenge provokes. De Castell (2004) notes that
educators may frequently “clutch at the First Amendment as a
justification for not doing what they ought to do, and saying what
they ought to say” (p. 55).
To expand upon this point, Jones (2004) has demonstrated
that the desire for dialogue can function to make White students
feel better about themselves by constituting them as “good whites”
who want to learn about diversity. The desire for the voice of the
Other, Jones explains, is parasitic on the needs and interests of the
dominant group and does not benefit students of color about whom
White students claim to be learning. The educator who could have
silenced the dominant student’s utterances in order to give voice to
the marginalized in the case that Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014)
depict might be expressing a personal desire for redemption and
reassurance of exceptionality. When she silences students for their
dominant perspective, Johnson (2008), for example, wonders with
remarkable frankness whether it is her own wounding that she is
trying to prevent rather than those of her students (p. 235).
Educators must turn the critical reflective gaze on themselves and
ask how they also benefit from silencing dominant-group members. Does silencing function to avoid conflict, confrontation, and
discomfort?
I am not implying that Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) intend
or are unaware of these consequences but rather caution that their
arguments could be easily used by others in this way and, thus,
the consequences of silencing must also be seriously considered.
Moreover, the role of discourse might also be emphasized more
consistently. Clearly Sensoy and DiAngelo understand how
discourse functions to sustain systemic injustice. Their analysis of
discourse in this essay and elsewhere (2012) demonstrates a
concern with how power works through language and refusing to
use language. They acknowledge the myriad ways that dominant
denials of racism are camouflaged behind “good intentions,”
“common sense,” “personal experience,” and a request for
evidence.
So it was surprising to read some of their recommended
strategies that might themselves promote discursive forms of denial.
For example, do some of the Silence Breakers/Question Starters that
are intended to encourage a way of leaning into difficult content fall
into discursive traps. When a student is encouraged to utter “I’m
really nervous” or “from my experience” or “I’m afraid I may offend,”
these may support distancing strategies that function as confession,
taking back the center and protecting White innocence. Bingham
(2002) urges social justice educators to teach students how to take
account of language as discourse as well as language as representation
so that students can appreciate how it is not always a matter of the
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substance of what they say or the intentions behind their words but
instead what their utterances do.
Finally, I would like to offer one small classroom strategy that I
have found helpful and that I believe is suggested in a quote from
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014). They write:
While we recognize that it is important to raise these perspectives . . .
we find it much more effective to do so in controlled ways. We then
return to them after we have laid enough groundwork, via study of key
concepts and literature, and begin to apply a critical analysis
[emphasis added]. (p. 6)

I too have found that just talking things out often keeps the
status quo intact. If ignorance is the problem, then our students
need tools that can help them listen and understand. Instead of
silencing in the way that Sensoy and DiAngelo advocate, I suggest
we tell students, “Hold that thought!” (If I say just “HTT,” my
students know what I mean.)
For example, on the first day of class a White student recently
asked (really, announced), “Dr. A., isn’t affirmative action a form of
reverse discrimination?” I understand this more as a discursive
strategy and a form of White talk (Hytten & Warren, 2003;
McIntyre, 1997). The student, however, does not yet have the tools
to understand this. I emphatically said no, but I asked the student to
HTT. When such questions are shared, I ask the student to present
that question later in the term, or I make sure it is part of the
curriculum when the students have the tools to engage in discussion around this question. In this way, rather than silence the
student, I defer consideration of the comment without supporting
what the student espouses and, in fact, vehemently rejecting it.
Moreover, even at this point, I explicitly indicate that the comment
will be critically addressed when the class has been exposed to the
relevant tools that can help make such a discussion constructive.
And by tools, I am referring to understanding, among other
things, the dangers of the ideology of colorblindness; the difference
between defining racism as only about prejudice and defining
racism as a system of privilege and oppression; the subtle ways that
White privilege can authorize the ability to be ignorant, arrogant,
and dismissive—what McIntosh (1997) refers to as “negative white
privilege”; as well as how White talk and distancing strategies
protect White innocence. Additionally, I employ videos and
ethnographic research to help students analyze from a third-person
perspective how discourse works to support and safeguard systems
of privilege and oppression from critique. I require them to write
reflective journals on how these discursive strategies may be
circulating in our classroom—that is, how they may themselves be
endorsing their ignorance and their ability to dismiss what students
of color are trying to say. An advantage of this approach is that it
provides me with a useful (although never completely reliable) way
to discern systemically privileged students who are willing to
engage and those who obstinately cling to their ignorance.
Does “Hold that thought!” avoid some of the consequences of
silencing? I am not certain and invite feedback on this suggested
pedagogical strategy. Social justice pedagogy is always challenging,
and as Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) note, “any resistive practice can
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come to serve the very interests it was developed to oppose” (p. 3).
I thank Sensoy and DiAngelo for their valuable contributions to
the conversation and for keeping the discussion on social justice
pedagogy ongoing.
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